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Abstract 
 
Cashew Production in Guinea Bissau 
 
Steven Kyle 
 
 
Cashew is by far the most important cash crop grown in Guinea Bissau.  Indeed, the 
degree of export dependence on this crop exceeds even the export dependence of most 
members of OPEC on oil exports.  This paper provides an overview of the current system 
of cashew production in Guinea Bissau and suggests policies to improve production, 
marketing and international sales.  
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   Cashew Production in Guinea Bissau1
            
        
I.  Cashew, Poverty, and the Macroeconomy 
 
 Cashew is by far the most important cash crop grown in Guinea Bissau.  Indeed, 
the degree of export dependence on this crop exceeds even the export dependence of 
most members of OPEC on oil exports.  This fact has led many observers to promote 
diversification away from cashew as a primary objective of any trade promotion effort.  
However laudable diversification may be (and indeed, it is a worthy goal not only to raise 
incomes but also to decrease the risk characteristics of export earnings) it is impossible to 
achieve broad based success in export promotion without a high degree of success in the 
cashew sector. 
 
 Simple arithmetic underscores this observation – with 98% of export earnings and 
17% of fiscal revenue derived from this crop, even unprecedented success with other 
products can yield only a marginal increase in the total.  However, much more than 
arithmetic dictates that a primary goal of any trade effort be directed toward the cashew 
sector:   
 
-  First, it is abundantly clear that Guinea Bissau possesses near optimal conditions for 
cashew production.  Indeed, not only is cashew produced virtually without purchased 
inputs in most cases, but the quality of the nuts is superior to those from many other 
exporters and so is capable of commanding a premium on the international market.  The 
rise of cashew cultivation is therefore no accident – producers are behaving very much in 
accord with what the standard predictions of comparative advantage would have them do.  
They gravitate toward a product in which they have relatively lower costs than do other 
producers. 
 
-  Second,  the vast majority of the cashew crop is produced by small farmers.  In many 
areas it is hard to find small farmers who do not grow at least some cashew.  According 
to recent estimates, more than 85% of the population is involved in cashew production in 
some way.2  This is extremely important in that it means that alterations in the farm gate 
price of cashews have a greater impact on the incomes of the poorest than any other 
variable in the economy.  One study by Boubacar-Sid et al. concluded that a 15% 
increase in the farm gate price of cashew could result in an increase in consumption of 
the extreme poor of 9.5% and by the poor of 3.3%. 
 
 Studies of the percentage of the export price actually received by farmers vary 
from as little as 20%3  to as much as 70%.4  Reports from the cashew harvest of 2008 
 
1 This paper is based on a report by Steven Kyle in May/June of 2008 written for the Guinea Bissau 
Diagnostic Trade Integration Study, and also has sections based on a report by Henrique Mendes in March 
2009, and an earlier report by JP Chausse in 2007 
2 See Mendes 2009 
3 Boubacar-Sid et. al. op. cit. page 70 
4  See Jaeger and Lynn 2004 
 3 
                                                
support an even higher figure of about 78%5.    Given the stop-go nature of government 
interventions in the sector in recent years it is entirely possible for this percentage to have 
varied enough for all of these analyses to be accurate for different years.  (It is worth 
noting that the low end figure of 20% reflects the extraordinary situation of 2006 and is 
not a “normal” occurrence.)  Table 1 shows a breakdown of the cashew marketing chain 
for 2007.  Table 2 shows the relationship between international prices and domestic 
prices at the port (i.e. farmgate plus internal marketing margins).  Late accounts from the 
2008 harvest reported prices to producers equivalent to as much as $950 US/MT and 
export prices (CIF) as high as $1300.6  These prices imply that producers were receiving 
about 73% of the international price, again in about the same range as prior years.  
However, these figures are extremely high in absolute terms and indicate that Guinea 
Bissau has benefited from what is perhaps the best year in history for cashew exports;  
average prices to producers are somewhat lower at $820/MT, reflecting the sharply rising 
trend through the latest harvest season. 
 The government’s determination to pursue development of the cashew sector was 
clearly demonstrated in the October 2008 National Cashew Conference in which it was 
agreed that promotion of processing and improved production and marketing would be 
key elements of a national strategy.  Implementation would be led by a newly created 
National Cashew Institute (INCA)  which would operate similarly to the analogous 
INCAJU in Mozambique.  Many of the key recommendations of this report were also 
emphasized in this conference – clearing the way for a consensus between the 
government and the donor community on an appropriate path for the future. 
 
 
II.  Cashew Production7  
 
 
A.  Cashew Producers and Production 
 
 It is estimated that cashews cover more than 6.7% of the national territory, or 
about 210,000 ha. and that each Bissau Guinean produces an average of more than 53 kg 
of raw cashew each year.8  The majority of families have at least some producing cashew 
plants.  It is estimated that cashew area is increasing at the rate of 4% per year though 
output is increasing at a rate of 10% due to the fact that many recently planted trees are 
only now reaching their period of highest productivity.  Table 3 shows agricultural 
production in Guinea Bissau where the importance of cashew is immediately obvious.  
Tables 4 and 5 show cashew production and processing figures for Guinea Bissau and 
other African cashew producing countries. 
 
 
5 See Mendes op. cit.  
6 See Relatorio da Iia Conferencia Nacional do Caju, 7-9 Outubro de 2008. 
7 This section draws on ; Jaeger and Lynn 2004, Chausse 2006 and Paiva 2007, 
8 See Mendes, op. cit. 
Formatted: Portuguese (Brazil)
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 Small farms account for about 80% of cashew plantations, with the average 
smallholder plantation being between 2 and 3 ha. Larger plantations  account for the 
balance, with one plantation of 1.300 ha. associated with a processing facility.  Though 
no detailed evaluation of the state of the trees themselves has been undertaken, it is 
obvious from the high growth of area under cashew in recent years that most are quite 
young and are therefore either in or close to their phase of maximum yield. Growth in 
production will thus continue for the next several years even without further planting as 
young plantations come on stream and reach full potential. At current rate of growth, 
production should reach 150,000 MT by 2010. 
 
 Cashew trees are established by direct seeding using random seeds and random 
spacing. There is little attention to the selection of seed nuts or parent plants or use of 
grafted seedlings. There has therefore been no genetic improvement of planting material 
and productive potential. Husbandry practices are poor. with little or no thinning or 
pruning of trees. In spite of this, yields appear relatively acceptable at 500-600 kg/ha. 
comparable to those in India and Brazil (although far from those achieved in Vietnam). 
Harvest and post harvest techniques are often inadequate (premature harvesting, 
inadequate drying, handling and storing), which generates losses in quantity and quality 
of nuts.  
 
 
B.  Common Cashew Diseases, Research and Extension  
 
 There is at the present time no effective extension presence in any agricultural 
areas.  There is a National Agricultural Research Institute in Guinea Bissau (INPA) 
which was in the past largely funded by donors but has been unfunded for several years 
and has therefore been largely dormant. What little (applied) research has taken place 
recently has been funded by private sector operators. However, little or none of this 
reaches the smallholders who constitute 80% of production in the country. 
 
 Disease has not yet affected production in any substantial way in Guinea Bissau. 
Anthracnose and Oidium both exist but are not widespread and have so far caused only 
limited damage, indicating that the Guinean cashew variety may be relatively resistant. 
Brazilian varieties introduced for their nut size have reportedly not had this resistance and 
have consequently been infected.  This indicates that there is an obvious case for 
conducting adaptive research to try to produce varieties that would incorporate local 
disease resistance characteristics into higher yielding varieties with larger nuts. 
 
 Farmers use no input or treatment.  This reduces cost and opens the possibility of 
niche markets for “organic” cashew9. However, it is unlikely that the current situation 
can  last indefinitely.  There are already some worrying signs of (localized) dying trees 
and experience shows that the development of a crop under monoculture conditions such 
as cashew in Guinea-Bissau is affected by pests and diseases that either adapt to local 
conditions or are inadvertently imported.  It is thus of the utmost importance that efficient 
crop protection services be urgently re-established.  Indeed, experience with Oidium and 
 
9 Agri-Bissau demonstrated the feasibility of doing this prior to its closure in 2006. 
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Anthracnose in other cashew producing countries (e.g. Mozambique) demonstrate that 
early action is essential in limiting losses to these problems. 
 
 There is no doubt that there are very clear public good characteristics of cashew 
research and extension.  Accordingly, it is essential that the government do whatever is 
necessary to revive INPA and reestablish collaboration with EMBRAPA in Brazil in 
order to quickly put in place an active research and extension program in cashew in 
Guinea Bissau. 
 
 Fortunately, the legal foundation for a funding mechanism is already in place 
though it has not been actually funded in recent years.  Of the revenue collected from the 
8.6% cashew export tax, 5% of the total is supposed to be diverted to the Conselho 
Nacional do Caju for purposes of research and development benefiting all growers.  
Diverting all or part of this income to cashew research and extension would be entirely in 
line with the intention of the original law but would require a political decision to ensure 
that the flow of funds actual occurs.  At present none of this money has been returned to 
the cashew sector in any form. 
 
C.  Markets, Prices and Processing 
 
Markets and Prices 
 
 Guinea-Bissau exports most (more than 95%) of its crop as dried-shell nuts to 
India where it is processed into kernels for consumption in the terminal markets. World 
demand for kernels has grown strongly (10% p.a.) over the last ten years.  In 2004, total 
consumption was estimates at about 300,000 tons with the main markets being: the North 
America (120,000 tons); India (80,000 tons); and Western Europe (60,000 tons). Demand 
is also exploding in East Asia and middle income countries in Eastern Europe and the 
Middle-East. World demand is expected to increase by 5-8% per years over the next 
decade. The national market is very small, estimated at less than 20 tons for the formal 
market (informal consumption unknown).  The Dakar and Banjul market is larger, but 
probably doesn’t exceed a few hundred tons and it is reported to be supplied by 
unregistered exports from Guinea Bissau. 
 
 The processing of raw nuts for supplying end-markets is dominated by three 
countries:  India (58%), Vietnam (25%) and Brazil (15%). African countries (Tanzania, 
Guinea-Bissau, Cote d’ Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria and Benin) account for close to 
40 % of total raw nut production and almost 100% of raw nut exports (almost exclusively 
to India) but they account for less than 2% of total processing.  The price of cashew nuts 
is derived from that of the kernel on end-markets (itself sensitive to the supply of 
substitute nuts such as almonds), and the market anticipation and short-term needs of the 
(Indian) processors which try to optimize the throughput of their plants. This induces a 
much higher price volatility for raw nuts than for finished products (kernels) both from 
year to year and, for a particular producing country, during the same season. After a sharp 
drop in 2000, the price of raw nuts recovered in 2003 and was in the US$650-900/ton 
range depending on origin and nut size in 2006.  In 2008 prices are extremely high with 
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contracts for Guinea Bissau’s product ranging as high as $1050/ton.   Guinea-Bissau 
produces good quality nuts highly sought after by processors because of a high outturn 
(kernel to unshelled nut) ratio.10 Guinea nuts command a premium over other origins 
(about US$60-100/kg). 
 
Domestic Marketing and Export 
 
 Domestic marketing and exports is carried out by traders and exporters in a 
relatively liberalized environment.  There are currently about 300 licensed (and many 
more unlicensed) traders operating in the interior and delivering nuts to Bissau 
warehouses and plants, and 40 licensed exporters. The law regulating the activities of 
traders and exporters was recently modified to eliminate entry barriers and lower entry 
costs11. As a result, competition has increased and marketing margins appear to have 
decreased. In addition, the National Farmers association (ANAG) has been active in 
providing price information to farmers, though at the present time the government has 
ceased attempts to influence the farmgate price after the disastrous experience in 2006.   
It is estimated that under normal circumstances12, farm-gate prices average between 60 
and 70% of fob prices.  There is thus little evidence of obvious profiteering in the 
marketing chain since the high costs of marketing in Guinea Bissau, including both 
internal transport and port costs explain the difference between farmgate and 
international prices.  
 
In spite of the reasonable efficiency of marketing agents, the cost of domestic marketing 
and exporting raw nuts (and kernels) is extremely high in Guinea Bissau. It is estimated 
that it costs up to US$300 to move nuts from farm-gate to processors in India.  
 
• The cost of freight to India is much higher than that from East Africa but also 
from other West African countries: about US$90/ton against US$40/ton from 
Abidjan. This is due the low traffic touching port in Bissau, the low depth of the 
harbor (compounded by the lack of dredging over an extended period) which 
limits the size of the ships that can dock and the perceived risk of accessing 
Bissau harbor. This represents foregone earnings for the country in the order of 
US$5.0 million per 100,000 MT exported.  Given the expectation of greater 
production figures in the future, the expected losses should rise proportionately.  
 
• Port charges are also extraordinarily high (about US$40/ton against less than 
US$10/ton in other West African countries) due to inadequate or missing loading 
equipment, inefficient services and a lack of security resulting in a high rate of 
theft. The rehabilitation of the Bissau harbor (both in terms of access to the port 
                                                 
10 According to reports cited in the recent Cashew Conference in October of 2008, Guinea Bissau’s raw 
nuts enjoy an outturn ratio of 48-56%, which compares well with India, at 50-56% the worl leader, and 
with Brazil, the largest producer with an average outturn of 50-55%.  No other African country produces 
nuts of a quality equivalent to Guinea Bissau.  
11 Although there are recurrent calls by nationals for excluding non-nationals from these activities and the 
law may not always be applied with consistency,  
12 This was not the case during the 2006 season because of government’s intervention (see below and the 
resulting uncertainty it created for traders activities, 
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and in terms of port efficiency), planned since 1997, has not yet been achieved 
though work has begun on improvements in the access roads to the port. 
  
• Expensive and bureaucratic export procedures including: high cost of transport 
and handling costs13; lengthy and expensive administrative procedures; an export 
tax (and related charges) of 8.6% of fob price14 (for nuts); and a certification 
(SGS) fee of about 4% of the fob price. It is estimated that it takes 9 different 
documents, 30 days and US$1,550 to export a 20 ft container.  Export procedures 
can and should be streamlined through a one-stop export window (a good 
example of such a mechanism is the Centre de Facilitation aux Filieres 
d’Exportation –CAFEX—in Guinea).    
 
• Domestic marketing costs are also high (about US$180/ton), in spite of adequate 
competition among traders, due to the poor state of the transport network which 
makes transport expensive in particular during the rainy season and the illegal 
levies collected at road blocks by government officials and armed forces.   
 
Improvement at every level of the marketing chain is thus critical to improve 
competitiveness and producers’ income. This should be a central focus of Government 
attention for supporting the development of the sector.  
 
Domestic Processing   
 
 There are currently three large scale processing units in Guinea Bissau.  Two –
Agri-Bissau and Sicaju-- have a capacity of one container of kernels per month (about 16 
tons) and the third – B&B Caju – a capacity of 8.6 tons per month15. These plants export 
on the international market (EU, USA). Although they appear reasonably efficient, they 
operate under rather precarious conditions because of the difficult business environment 
in Guinea-Bissau.   In addition, there are 21 small processing units established with 
Enterprise Works’ assistance under the USAID-funded TIPS project, with combined 
production capacity of about 13 tons of kernel per month.   
 
Guinean processors face several disadvantages: 
 
• Competition with exporters -  The main issue is that of securing the procurement 
of raw nuts in the context of a strong competition with raw nut exporters. 
International nut buyers want to ensure their own supply of nuts (as long as there 
is strong demand and unused capacity in India and Vietnam, which is going to be 
the case for the near future, thought India does have a long term policy of 
                                                 
13 The warehouse (Bissau) to port cost for a 16t container of kernel is estimated at US$1,500, i,e, 
US$100/ton,  
14 This levy can be justified in economic terms if it were to be used for research or other public good ends 
which benefited all producers. 
15 A fourth unit – GETA—(belongs to the Minister of Finance) is non-operational at the moment, in need of 
rehabilitation, but, being of the mechanized OLTRAMARE technology it is not viable/competitive and 
shouldn’t be rehabilitated, 
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achieving self sufficiency in raw cashew production) and thus compete with local 
processing by offering high prices and accepting little or no margin on their 
procurement operations.   This problem is particularly evident in the current 
harvest season, with prices in Bissau reportedly reaching as high as CFA 430/kg. 
a price that domestic processors cannot pay and remain profitable under current 
international market conditions. 
 
• Small plant size -   Only three plants currently have the minimum economic size 
(about 1,000 MT/year). The other local processors, established under the TIPS 
program, are too small to meet importers requirements in terms of quality and 
quantity (minimum one container/16 tons per month). Their main outlets are the 
limited domestic and regional markets. These plants will not be able to export 
until their production is marketed/exported through a central unit16.  
 
• High investment costs -  The cost of establishing a processing plant appears 
extremely high when compared to other African countries such as Tanzania and 
Mozambique, and even higher when compared to India.  The cost of a 1,200 
MT/year plant is reported to about US$800,000 against US$ 250,000 in 
Mozambique.  High investment costs have been attributed  to (i) the cost of land 
(though this problem can be overcome if plants are located in rural areas rather 
than Bissau), (ii) the cost of construction; (iii) the cost of equipment (imported 
from Brazil or Portugal, though there is no apparent reason Guinea Bissau cannot 
access the same suppliers as e.g. Mozambique); and (iv) import duties (5%) and 
taxes paid on imported equipment  (though this would appear to be a problem 
entirely under the control of the government).  This cost difference needs to be 
investigated in detail, though it appears that lower cost options exist for the 
problems cited.  
 
• Need to constitute stocks -  Cashew processors need to build substantial nut 
inventories since harvest takes place during a 4-5 month period whereas kernel 
production is spread over the entire year. It is estimated that a local plant of 1,200 
MT capacity needs to secure an inventory about 700 tons of nuts for processing 
after the harvest period, at a total cost of about US$300,000. This is not the case 
for Indian processors who can import nuts from different countries throughout the 
year.  
 
• Lack of/high cost of credit -  High investment costs and the need to constitute 
substantial inventories are compounded by the difficulty of accessing investment 
or working capital credit from local financial institutions (most investments have 
been financed from own funds and off-shore sources) and the very high cost of 
commercial bank funding (14-19% p.a.). 
 
 
16 Many small units have sold to/through BBCaju to achieve the minimum shipment of one 
container/month 
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• Low labor productivity -  Processing is highly labor intensive and labor 
productivity is thus a major determinant of competitiveness. Processors complain 
of the handicap imposed by low labor productivity (lack of skills, absenteeism) 
and the current wage policy (which makes firing an employee extremely difficult 
and costly). In particular, they strongly favor a more flexible wage policy and, to 
increase productivity, a performance-based payment system where employees are 
paid by the piece. 
 
• Small domestic market -  The domestic market in Guinea-Bissau lacks the 
capacity to absorb a significant amount of kernels (in addition to those of a lower 
quality, produced by cottage industry) and/or cashew by-products (except cashew 
liquor or aguardente) such as cashew jam, juice/wine and other secondary 
products. The national market is very small, estimated at less than 20 tons for the 
formal market (informal consumption unknown).  
 
It is clear that a strategy of promoting processing of the cashew crop can not only 
increase the value added accruing to the country but can also reduce the risk associated 
with cashew dependence due to the much higher volatility of raw nut prices as compared 
to processed.  This alone is a prima facie case for some level of protection to promote the 
industry, as is the cost of start-up noted above.  
 
However, before embarking on such an effort it will be necessary to thoroughly examine 
the relative price relationships between raw and processed nuts to confirm whether 
Guinea Bissau can realistically expect to be able to compete with Indian purchasers 
operating on much narrower margins.  The answer to this in the Mozambican case is 
clearly yes (given the 18% export tax on raw nuts) which would seem to indicate that it is 
at least plausible to think that Guinea Bissau could also do so.  But in doing so it is 
important to bear in mind that the Mozambican model uses a somewhat different 
organization for its processing sector (medium size plants located in or near producing 
areas) and does not face some of the high cost of doing business that apparently plague 
Guinean operators. 
 
 However, it is eminently justifiable in theoretical terms to regard the difficulties 
associated with doing business in Guinea Bissau as a form of market failure requiring 
government intervention to alleviate the problem.  This means that it is far more desirable 
to effect the needed protection through targeted efforts at the high production and 
financing costs for processing startup than to raise export taxes though the Mozambican 
experience shows that this is a viable method to promote processing.
 
 Such targeted efforts could include efforts to lower land costs through use of 
government land in selected areas, exemption from import duties on all equipment and 
construction materials, tax holidays, or other means to reduce the costs associated with 
setting up  processing facilities.  It is also important to note that the Mozambican model 
of cashew processing is low enough in cost that processors are able to pay 20% more to 
farmers than exporters can, which would seem to indicate that the 18% export tax is a key 
factor in giving the processors this advantage. 
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 For the moment, local processors benefit from a moderate protection through an 
8.6% tax on raw nut exports.  This protection, although higher than in other West African 
countries, is lower than in the countries that have been successful at developing a 
domestic processing sector (Brazil and India, but also Vietnam and Mozambique). Given 
the fact that there is some degree of investment taking place already17 it is likely that the 
needed assistance can be achieved at a relatively modest cost.  A targeted study of exactly 
what would be needed is clearly indicated. 
 
 The export tax is 6% of the government’s established export reference price 
(US$600/ton in 2008) to which is added a “tax on rural enterprises” and a tax on 
industrial enterprises” of respectively 2.0 and 0.6% of the reference price.  It is important 
to note that these taxes, based as they are on a fixed price18 (“base tributaria”) are NOT 
ad valorem taxes within any marketing year.  If, as is the case in 2008, the actual export 
prices are higher than the price upon which taxes are based then the tax remains constant 
in absolute terms, affording a consequently lower level of protection than the 8.6% figure 
seems to indicate.  For example, the current “base tributaria” of $600 yields a rate of 
protection of only 4.9% on actual export prices of $1050. 
 
 It is also important to note that cashew processing should not be evaluated solely 
on the basis of a strict comparison of costs and benefits accruing to the cashew processors 
alone.  Rather, it is possible and indeed likely that there may be significant social benefits 
to a processing sector that should also weigh in the calculation.  It is clear that 
development in the broadest sense involves a process of successfully diversifying the 
economy into progressively higher value-added forms of production as this permits 
higher outputs and incomes per worker and promotes the development of an industrial 
labor force able to be productive in a broad spectrum of activities.  It is also usually the 
case that the best candidate for such activities is to enter into transformation of raw 
materials already in abundant supply in the country in question.  In Guinea Bissau this 
clearly points toward the cashew sector. 
 
 In addition, it is also the case that a strictly static view of the question may not be 
entirely appropriate – though Guinea Bissau may face higher costs in the short run, this is 
not at all a given in the long run, adding to the case for investigating the needs for a 
viable cashew processing sector.  This is particularly true if India achieves its long term 
goal of self sufficiency in raw nuts.  Finally, there may also be some degree of 
subsidization of competing processors elsewhere in the world – indeed, their current 
willingness to pay CFA 340/kg when international prices are in the range of $800-
 
17 New entries are apparently taking place: Brazilian investors are to open a factory in Quinhamel (Northern 
part of the country), and the existing enterprise operating in Bolama (Island) is about to expand to Binta 
(Eastern Region of the country),  New investors have also recently purchased the plantation and processing 
facilities of Agri-Bissau. 
18 The base tributaria is not to be confused with the reference price of previous marketing years.  It is NOT 
a government indicated fixed price for marketing purposes.  Rather, it is simply an accounting convention 
used to compute the export tax due on any given shipment of cashew.  Rather than looking at actual current 
contract values, all that is needed is to weigh the shipment and calculate the tax due based on the base price 
specified for  that marketing year.   
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900/MT would seem to provide some evidence in favor of this possibility – and this 
subsidization may also not be something that will be a permanent state of affairs. 
 
 
Cashew Processing Technology 
 
Cashew development in other African countries has in some cases been plagued by 
debates over the appropriate technology to use in processing,  Mozambique is perhaps the 
most obvious example of this.  However, this experience also points the way to a viable 
strategy for Guinea Bissau. 
 
 The competitiveness of the local processing industry largely hinges on the 
processing efficiency (kernel outturn) and operating costs of the processing technology. 
Past experience in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Benin and Tanzania, indicates that the 
plants set up in the 1980s-1990s using mechanized technology (Ultramare) are not 
competitive because of high investment and operating costs and low kernel outturn. 
These technologies are clearly uncompetitive with the operating cost and efficiency of 
manual technologies used in India, and they have all closed down even when benefiting 
from substantial protection from competition. The model developed by EnterpriseWorks, 
although it requires very little initial investment, has also proved uncompetitive. It has 
too small a size to achieve economies of scale and meet importers requirements in terms 
of minimum quantity.  
 
A model developed in Mozambique by Technoserve appears much more promising. It is 
based on a comprehensive approach that addresses all important aspects of cashew 
processing: 
 
• Small scale plants (between 1,000 and 1,500 MT/year) using a manual technology 
derived from the Indian model, which (i) requires a low investment (about 
US$300,000 or less than 30% of that of a large scale mechanized plant on a per 
ton basis), has a low operating cost (less than 40% of a large plant); and (iii) 
produces a high net yield (21%) and high whole nut yield (over 70%); 
 
• A manual technology that creates about 300 jobs per processing unit, with a high 
proportion of female labor;  
 
• Plants located in prime producing regions which is suitable for procuring from 
smallholders, decreases transport cost and improve their contact with farmers and 
ability to provide services (contract farming); 
 
• The provision of professional assistance to entrepreneurs on many aspects, from 
market access to plant and quality management (HACCP certification) to services 
to farmers. 
 
There are now 15 such units operating in Mozambique, processing about 20,000 MT of 
nuts produced by some 100,000 smallholders. These plants have been able to pay around 
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20% more for the nuts than exporters and a premium of about 15% for high quality nuts 
(achieved with a protection against raw nut exports of an export tax of 18% on raw nut 
exports). 
 
The main issues that require attention in developing a strategy for promoting cashew 
processing in Guinea Bissau are:  (i) investment costs as discussed above; (ii) operating 
costs, including labor productivity; (iii) the location of processing facilities; and (iv) the 
incentives that would be necessary to encourage private investments.  They are briefly 
discussed below.  
 
 
Operating costs: labor wages/productivity and access to finance 
 
 The major operating costs are (i) the cost and productivity of labor; and (ii) the 
cost of procuring the raw material, including the cost of financing the necessary inventory 
of nuts.  
 
• Labor costs represent about 45% of total operating costs. The competitiveness of 
cashew processing is thus highly sensitive to labor costs and productivity. This 
underlines the critical importance to be given to labor training  to improve 
throughput efficiency and the quality of kernels (in order to eventually achieve the 
level of  Indian performance of 80% whole kernels), and a performance-based 
labor compensation system.   
 
• Cashew processing requires substantial working capital for funding the inventory 
of nuts bought during the three months harvest period. The level of interest rates 
is thus an important factor in processing competitiveness. One option would be to 
rely on commercial sources, though this exposes operators to the risk of spikes in 
interest rates. Another option to explore would be the establishment of a credit 
guarantee scheme similar to that operating in Mozambique (funded by USAID) 
which provides a guarantee of up to 50% of the credit to qualifying enterprises.  
However, the latter would have to meet the BCEAO requirement that borrowers 
have a satisfactory accounting system (SYSCOA) to access commercial bank 
funding.  The recent Cashew Conference in Bissau in October of 2008 endorsed 
an effort to develop along the lines of the Mozambican model, and particularly 
endorsed the establishment of a guarantee system to be funded via the existing 
export tax on cashews.  20% of these receipts would be dedicated to the newly 
created guarantee fund which would be adminstered by a new institution – The 
National Cashew Institute. 
 
 
 One way to minimize the cost of access to utilities and other basic services is to 
establish “industrial parks” to facilitate “enterprises clustering”.   However, in the case of 
cashew processing it appears that this “solution” is in fact aimed at a problem which does 
not necessarily affect this particular activity.  Indeed, cashew processing generates its 
own energy (and can even sell excess electricity to neighboring users) and water supply is 
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generally abundant in the country. In addition, decentralizing processing on the 
Technoserve model:  (i) decreases the cost of land; (ii) permits direct procurement of nuts 
from producers thus eliminating middlemen and lowering marketing margins; (iii) 
decreases transportation costs; and (iv) allows processing plants to operate as well as 
service centers for delivering planting material and advice to producers.   
 
 
 
D.  Policy and Institutional Environment 
 
 The history of government policy in the cashew sector has had a major impact on 
performance over the past few years, with prices varying from as low as 50CFAF to more 
than 430 CFAF per kilo.  This range of variation is far greater than that in international 
prices and is a prima facie case for an end to government intervention in order to stabilize 
the market.  In 2006 the government initially set a price of 350 CFAF in response to a 
perception that international traders were colluding to depress domestic prices.  The 
resulting withdrawal of traders at these unrealistic price levels resulted in a drop in prices 
offered and accumulating stocks. The government eventually had to lower export taxes to 
encourage traders to buy up the remaining harvest. Smuggling also increased 
significantly.  As a result, fiscal revenues, foreign exchange earnings and farmers’ 
incomes all declined.    
 
 The consequences of this intervention have led the government to state its 
commitment to avoid any price setting in the cashew sector going forward, but there does 
remain some government intervention.  For example, the government still makes it a 
point to mark the traditional opening of the cashew harvest even though the date on 
which this is done is in fact after the point at which some of the harvest has already 
ripened.  There is also still a feeling within Government that international traders and 
exporters may collude in Guinea Bissau so that the possibility of government intervention 
remains a concern in the minds of many market participants. 
 
 All observers both inside Guinea Bissau and outside the country are in agreement 
that improving the performance of the cashew sector is essential to growth and poverty 
alleviation in the country.  Further, there is clear agreement that improvements are 
needed at the levels of production, marketing and processing.  However, there is still no 
clear statement of what the role of government is  vis a vis the private sector, and no road 
map of how to achieve the goals desired.  In spite of the lack of a clear statement by the 
government, the experience of the past few years has crystallized perceptions among 
most observers as to what such a statement should contain.  It is essential that such a clear 
statement be made, but there is little question that the following points would be included 
in any consensus document produced by the government together with the private sector: 
 
1.  It is the responsibility of the private sector to carry out all activities related directly to 
production, marketing and processing of cashew. 
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2.  It is the responsibility of the government to ensure the viability of private sector 
activities through the provision of the following public goods: 
 
 -  Research into improved varieties of cashew and into methods needed to limit  
 the spread of common diseases and pests. 
 
 -  Extension of the results to smallholders 
 
 - Adequate infrastructure, particularly secondary and primary roads and port 
 facilities 
 
 - Enabling business environment 
 
 The experience with government intervention in the cashew market in 2006 has 
had a profound effect on public perceptions of the desirability of further government 
efforts to “stabilize” this sector.  The end result of the stop-go government pricing 
initiatives in that year was to reduce the average price received by producers to about 
CFAF110/kg. With well-functioning markets, the producer price would have averaged, as 
in previous years, about 60-70% of the fob price, i.e. about CFAF200/kg.  Government 
actions thus induced a loss for farmers of at least CFAF90/kg. With a crop estimated at 
over 100,000 tons, this amounted to a total loss of income of close to CFAF100.0 billion 
(US$20 million) for cashew producers (a near halving of the potential income).  
 
 The marketing difficulties experienced in 2006 also induced a substantial increase 
in the smuggling of nuts through Senegal, Guinea and The Gambia.  Although actual data 
is missing, it is estimated that illegal nuts exports of 40,000 tons represented about 
US$20.0 million in lost foreign exchange earnings and US$ 2.5 million in lost export 
taxes. Finally, the lowering of export taxes in December 2006 may have cost up to 
CFAF300.0 million (for 20,000 tons). 
 
 Since that time the government has studiously avoided direct intervention in the 
market and this together with higher international prices has resulted in an average price 
to farmers in the current year that is estimated to be in the vicinity of CFA 225-250.  In 
addition, the higher prices paid in the countryside and Bissau itself have reduced the 
incentives to smuggle to Senegal. 
 
 In essence, the experience of the past three years has made clear what the 
government should not do.  What is less clear is the absolutely essential need for the 
government to actively do those things that the private sector cannot – in particular, 
activities related to research, extension, and provision of the conditions and incentives 
needed for growth of a processing sector.  The following section summarizes areas where 
an active government action is needed. 
 
 
 
 
 15 
Areas of Government Responsibility in Support of the Cashew Sector 
 
 Government support or action is needed in the following areas: 
 
 - Provision of funding for needed public sector activities -  Donor-funded projects 
supporting the sector (USAID-TIPS) closed in 2003. As a result, critical public services 
are non-existent: the plant protection services of the Ministry of Agriculture are not 
operational; The National Agricultural Research Institute (INPA)19 has no research 
activity on cashew and there are no extension programs; and there is no support for 
farmer organizations. By law (Law N1/2000), Government must transfer 5% of the total 
amount of taxes collected on cashew exports to three institutions critical for sector 
development: CNC, IMPA and ANAG.  However, this has never been done. As a result, 
these institutions have been largely non-functional.   
 
 -  Compensate for Credit Market Failures -  Cashew producers have no access to 
credit:  commercial banks do not finance producers, micro-finance institutions are not 
present in most rural areas and processing plants do not engage in contract farming 
arrangements (in part because they themselves have difficulty in accessing credit for 
working capital needs. Traders, exporters and processors have a very limited access to 
financial services. For the most part, the purchase of nuts from producers is funded either 
by traders on their own funds (small local and Mauritanian traders) or international 
buyers who arrange off-shore credit for exporters who in turn pre-finance their up-
country buyers. There are four commercial banks operating in Guinea-Bissau. These are 
all fairly liquid and the local BCEAO offers refinancing facilities for financing the 
purchase of the crop.  However, the risk perceived by banks, and BCEAO requirement 
that borrowers demonstrate that they have a satisfactory accounting system (Systeme de 
Comptabilite Ouest Africaine SYSCOA) largely prevent most private operators from 
accessing commercial bank funding. The newly created Banque Regional de Solidarite 
(BRS) has also opened a branch in Bissau. However, its operating policies, mostly 
targeting “vulnerable groups” and providing financing for “micro-projects”, are not 
suitable for financing cashew marketing or processing activities. Finally, FUNDEI, a 
credit program supported by the Swedish Development Agency (SIDA),  has provided 
funding to local processors for financing raw nut inventories, though it is no longer 
functioning.   Funding, in particular for investments in processing facilities and for 
funding the large working capital required will be a major constraint to the development 
of local processing. 
 
 It should be made very clear that it is not a good idea for the government to 
engage in direct credit provision through a development bank or directly administered 
fund.  Rather, a credit guarantee mechanism such as that used with the Technoserve 
model in Mozambique could be implemented  in Guinea Bissau given the creation of the 
necessary institutional mechanisms. 
 
 -  Quality Control/Grading of Nuts -  There is no laboratory specializing in quality 
control of exported nuts or kernels.  As a result, the quality of nuts is assessed by 
                                                 
19 INPA has some staff but no operating budget so that currently it has no active research program, 
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international buyers who tend to minimize it.  This has a depressing effect on producer 
prices. At present, kernel exports are not subjected to stringent demands in terms of 
safety standards or code of practices.  All these issues are however receiving increasing 
attention in Europe and North America and attention will turn to nuts as well. Indeed, 
cashew processing has a poor reputation for standard of hygiene and social responsibility 
with respect to workers conditions. Traceability will become increasingly important and 
factories will need to gain accreditation to standards such as HACCP and ISO.  Guinea-
Bissau is not equipped to face the quality/safety requirements for kernels that will be 
introduced by consuming countries (EU) in January 2008.  Meeting these food safety 
standards will require that processing plants be “certified” and that kernel exports be 
analyzed by an authorized laboratory. An EU/UEMOA program is currently being 
implemented to address general food safety issues.  However, there is an urgent need for 
assistance to (i) establish a licensed laboratory and standards testing facility for the 
sector; and (ii) help local processing plants making the investments required for their 
certification (“mise a niveau”).  
 
 -   Strategic Coordination -  Private operators are organized in several “interest 
groups”. ANAG represents agricultural and thus cashew producers. It is active in policy 
discussions.  However, it lacks adequate funding to develop its advocacy, capacity-
building and field services. Traders, exporters and processors have also formed their 
respective associations.  All these organizations are represented, along with 
Government’s ministries, on the National Cashew Council (CNC) which is the institution 
responsible for advising government on all cashew-related issues.  Under its current 
structure/mandate, however, the CNC is a hybrid, dysfunctional organization20: (i) its 
mandate is unclear21; and (ii) it doesn’t have any resources to carry out its activities. Its 
mixed membership – public and private – makes for an unclear mandate.  At the same 
time it performs the functions of an advisory body helping shape policy; an advocacy 
body representing specific private interests;  a regulatory body; a body managing private 
stakeholders’ common interests.  It therefore appears necessary to clear separate reassess 
the mandate and composition of the CNC – separating public goods/regulatory functions 
from private sector interests and collective actions-- and to give this institution the 
resources need for undertaking collective action on behalf of its stakeholders. 
 
 
 
 
E.  Next Steps 
 
 Several steps seem to be clearly indicated given the above considerations: 
 
 
20 CNC’s powerlessness was illustrated by its inability to prevent government from fixing a totally 
unrealistic producer price for the 2006 season,  That this has not been done since that time is more a tribute 
to the obvious negative consequences in 2006 than to the influence of the CNC 
21 Indeed, the president of the CNC is a civil servant in the Ministry of Trade, complicating the status of the 
organization as a supposedly independent entity. 
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• Launch the pilot research program -  The joint cashew research program between 
IMPA and EMBRAPA, the Brazilian agricultural research institute, should be 
launched without delay. Its content should de developed in close collaboration with 
all stakeholders, in particular the CNC, and focus in priority on measures for disease 
control and improving productivity at farm level, including selection and genetic 
improvement.  During the implementation of this joint program, INPA should 
develop a highly prioritized medium-term research program to be funded through the 
transfer of export revenues mentioned above. 
 
 
• Develop and Implement a Cashew Processing Promotion Project – Successful 
development of cashew processing is key to the future development of the sector.  
Use of the Mozambican model of decentralized processing facilities should be 
seriously considered, together with a package of incentives designed to overcome the 
high cost of doing business in Guinea Bissau.  Among these are:  the high cost of land, 
the high taxes on inputs, machinery, etc.; the lack of available financing; the rigidity 
of existing labor laws. 
 
• Addressing priority safety standard issues -  As noted above, Guinean kernel will 
be required to meet strict safety standards for exports to the EU if it is to export 
processed product directly.   It is thus necessary to (i) assist the existing processing 
plants to carry out a detailed technical audit of their operations and undertake the 
upgrading necessary for obtaining their certification; and (ii) undertake an assessment 
of the complementary investment necessary to upgrade one of the existing 
laboratories in the country to the level required for carrying out internationally 
accepted pre-shipment inspection of kernel exports.  
 
• Streamlining export procedures -  It is estimated that the export of one container of 
cashew (up to FOB level) requires close to 30 days and 9 different administrative 
procedures, and costs US$1,60022.  It is recommended that serious consideration be 
immediately be given to establishing in Guinea-Bissau a one-stop export window 
similar to the “Centre de Facilitation aux Filieres d’Exportation – (CAFEX )” 
operating satisfactorily in Guinea. 
 
• Preparing a prioritized operational strategy -  The government, in close 
collaboration with all stakeholders, should immediately prepare an operational 
strategy and medium-term program for the development of the cashew sector. This 
strategy/program should focus on achieving the following objectives:  (i) sustained 
productivity increases at farm level, (ii) increased efficiency at all levels of the value 
chain and (iii) increased value added through local processing. It should also specify 
clearly the institutional framework (as mentioned above) and establish sustainable 
mechanisms for addressing critical farm productivity issues (research, access to 
agricultural advice), strengthening farmer organizations, improving access to 
international markets, and promoting efficient local processing.  The participatory 
 
22 Source:  Doing Business 2006, World Bank,  
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preparation of this strategy/program would be a powerful instrument to build the 
capacity of all stakeholders to analyze issues and options and to undertake collective 
action on common priorities. 
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Table 1: Cost Structure of Cashew Marketing  1 MT  – 2007 Harvest  
          CFA 
 
Acquisition price of trader       200,000 
 
 Trader margin          25,000 
 Transport from Interior        14,400 
 Trader price in Bissau       239,400 
 
Acquisition price of exporter      239,400 
 
 Customs tax (6% of FOB value Bissau)      17,280 
 CPR/DGCI (2% o FOB value Bissau)        5,760 
 ACI/DGCI (CFA 27/ s5kg)          6,750 
 APGB             4,650 
 Transport from warehouse to port         3,158 
 Loading and Unloading          2,500 
 Pre-embarcation weighing             259 
 Bank Costs          12,384 
 Sacks             6,250 
 Certificate of Origin           1,500 
 Phytosanitary certificate               53 
 Despachante fee              413 
 SGS  (certification fee)          1,500 
 Warehouse rental           1,500 
 
Sub Total          303.357 
 
 Administrative Costs                 25 
 Spoilage             1,296 
 Contingencies                500 
 Exporter Margin          25,000 
 
Sub Total            26,821 
 
Export Price          330,178 
 
 
 
Source:  CNC Caderno de Exportacao 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Cashew Prices (US Dollars / Metric Ton) 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
Domestic Purchase 
Price in Bissau 
 
International Price 
Domestic Price 
as % of 
International 
1998 $ 589  $ 739  80 % 
1999 714  844  85 
2000 595  745  80 
2001 600  730  82 
2002 380  500  76 
2003 545  675  81 
2004 550  700  79 
2005 523  658  79 
2006 505  652  77 
2007 470  621  76 
2008 821 1050 78 
 
 
Source: 1998-2007 Ministerio de Comercio, Industria e Artesanato; 2008 Mendes 2009 
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Table 3:  Agricultural Production 
 
  
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2005 2006/2007 Growth 
            
Rice 66,423 89192 98339 112490 14.4% 
Maize 20639 31,868 39,835 41,827 5.0% 
Mil 10025 31,473 47,209 49,569 5.0% 
Sorghum 22669 15,506 23,359 24,527 5.0% 
Millet 698 1,836 2,295 1,836 -20.0% 
Céréales du SAB 1,000 1,500 1,500 1,500 0.0% 
TOTAL CEREALS 121,454 171,375 212,537 231,749 9.0% 
      
      
      
  
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 Variation 
            
Cassava 26,502 27,006 27,519 28,042 1.9% 
Sweet Potatoes 24,502 24,967 25,442 25,925 1.9% 
Vegetables  53,298 54,310 55,342 56,393 1.9% 
Fruits 1,331,117 1,356,408 1,382,180 1,408,441 1.9% 
      
      
  
2003/2004 2004/2005 2005/2006 2006/2007 Variation 
            
Groundnut 5,421 5,524 5,629 5,736 1.9% 
Cashew Nut 84,800 97,900 115,000 126,500 10.0% 
Palm Nut 268 273 278 283 1.9% 
Cotton     187   
 
Source: CNPE 
 
 22 
 
 
Table 4:   Cashew Production in Sub Saharan Africa 
 
Country 2008 Production in MT 
Ivory Coast 220,000 
Guinea Bissau 130,000 
Tanzania 100,000 
Nigeria 75,000* 
Mozambique 80,000 
Benin 65,000 
Senegal 15,000* 
Togo 3,000* 
Ghana 10,000* 
Kenya 5,000* 
Burkina Faso 5,000* 
Mali 3,000* 
Guinea Conakry 3,000* 
* 2006 figures 
Source: African Cashew Alliance 
 
 
 
 
Table 5:  Cashew Processing In Sub Saharan Africa in 2006 
 
Country Processing (for Export) Processing (for domestic    
market) 
Mozambique 25,000  
Nigeria 16,000 2,500 
Tanzania 15,000  
Kenya 5,000  
Ivory Coast 5,000 500 
Guinea Bissau 2,500 500 
Benin 1,500 80 
Burkina Faso 900  
Ghana 500 80 
Senegal  150 
Togo  80 
Mali   
Guinea Conakry   
Total 71,400 3,860 
 
Source:  African Cashew Alliance 
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